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BLD-144        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1078 
___________ 
 
DAVID STEVENSON; 
MICHAEL MANLEY; 
MICHAEL L. JONES, 
   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN THOMAS CARROLL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00139) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 22, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 6, 2012 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Stevenson, Michael Manley, and Michael L. Jones (collectively 
“plaintiffs”), all pro se inmates, appeal from the order of the District Court granting 
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summary judgment to defendant Warden Thomas Carroll.  We will summarily affirm.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in March 2004.  At that 
time, they were detainees at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“VCC”), Smyrna, 
Delaware, and were then housed in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”).  They asserted 
that their placement in the SHU violated their substantive and procedural due process 
rights, and they sought return to the general prison population, monetary damages, and 
the establishment of a system of review for transfers of pretrial detainees into the SHU.  
The District Court dismissed the case pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and we 
reversed on appeal.  Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir. 2007). 
The following is taken from our precedential opinion: 
At the time of their complaint, Stevenson and Manley were awaiting resentencing. 
Both had been convicted and sentenced to death in January 1997, but their 
sentences were vacated and remanded on or about May 30, 2001. At that time, 
they were moved off death row, and into the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”). 
Stevenson was moved from the SHU to a less restrictive pre-trial facility in 
December 2003, but was returned to the SHU in January 2004. Neither one of 
them received a hearing or explanation for their transfers into the SHU. They were 
both subsequently re-sentenced to death on February 3, 2006.  
  
Jones was awaiting trial at the time of the complaint. Following a disruption at 
Gander Hill Prison in Wilmington, Delaware, he and several other inmates were 
moved to the SHU on or about February 19, 2003. Jones asserts that, like 
Stevenson and Manley, he was not afforded an explanation or hearing regarding 
his transfer into more restrictive housing. He does, however, state that he was 
alleged to have been involved in the riot at Gander Hill. Jones was subsequently 
found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on 
September 16, 2005. 
 
Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 64-65. 
3 
 
 
Following remand, Carroll moved for summary judgment.  By then, Stevenson 
and Manley had been moved to death row, and Jones was in the area of the SHU reserved 
for sentenced inmates. 
After discovery, the District Court expanded on the facts.  In June 2001, 
Stevenson’s lawyer wrote to then-Warden Snyder inquiring about the reason for his 
placement in the SHU.  In January 2002, Stevenson was informed that his move was 
based on his pending penalty phase retrial and on disorderly threatening behavior and 
inmate demonstration.  His placement was reviewed in January 2003; later that month, 
the Institutional Base Classification Committee (“IBCC”) approved the recommendation 
to house him in the SHU pending resentencing based on his risk assessment score and his 
open first-degree murder charge.  Stevenson received notice of the decision; he also 
received two written responses from his counselor in 2003 regarding his placement.
1
     
 Like Stevenson, Manley was notified in January 2002 that his move to the SHU 
following the reversal of his death sentence was based on his pending penalty phase 
retrial.  His placement was reviewed in January 2003; the IBCC approved the 
recommendation to house him in the SHU pending resentencing based on his risk 
assessment score and his open first-degree murder charge.  Manley received notice of the 
decision; he also received written responses from two different counselors in 2003 
regarding his placement.
2
  
                                              
1
 Stevenson received several disciplinary reports between 2001 and 2004. 
2
 Manley received several disciplinary reports between 2002 and 2004.)   
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Carroll wrote a memorandum to the Chief of the Delaware Bureau of Prisons 
(“BOP”) in June 2003 regarding Stevenson’s and Manley’s complaints.  In it, Carroll 
noted that both inmates were awaiting resentencing after having death sentences 
overturned, both were held without bail, and both were viewed as security risks in the 
general population. 
While awaiting trial at a different institution, Jones was involved in an incident 
with other inmates in which they tried to harm a fellow inmate.  As a result, the BOP 
transferred Jones to the SHU pretrial unit at VCC.  Jones wrote letters to a counselor, the 
Deputy Warden, Carroll, the DOC Commissioner, and the Governor of Delaware 
complaining about his transfer and stating that he had not received notice of charges and 
had not been given an opportunity to respond.  Jones received a number of disciplinary 
reports between 2002 and 2005.  In 2005, he was convicted of three counts of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to three life sentences without the possibility of parole. 
According to Carroll and other prison officials, the main reason for Stevenson’s 
and Manley’s placement in the SHU was the fact that they were facing possible death 
sentences.  The prison also considered the fact that they had murdered a state’s witness, 
and believed that the crime foreshadowed future similar conduct.  The prison determined 
that they presented a significant risk if housed in the general population.  Jones was 
placed in the SHU because of his serious pending charges (three counts of first degree 
murder) and because of his significant disciplinary record.   
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The District Court considered Stevenson’s and Jones’ responses3 before granting 
the summary judgment motion.  The court first found that plaintiffs had not exhausted 
their administrative remedies, and that Carroll was entitled to protection from official-
capacity claims for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment.  The District Court 
also found for Carroll on the merits of both the substantive and procedural due process 
claims.  Finally, the court also held that even if the plaintiffs’ claims should have 
survived summary judgment on the merits, Carroll was entitled to qualified immunity.
4
  
Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In reviewing a District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment, we apply the same test the District Court applied.  Saldana 
v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is proper when, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all 
inferences in that party's favor, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 232; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the . . . pleading,” but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
                                              
3
 Manley did not file a response. 
 
4
 Because we have concluded that plaintiffs’ claims are either moot or barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment or qualified immunity, we need not address the exhaustion 
issue or the merits of the due process claim.   
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genuine issue for trial.”  Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). 
III. 
A.  Money Damages 
We agree with the District Court that plaintiffs’ claims against Carroll in his 
official capacity are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.  Barring consent, a state or 
one of its agencies is immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.  
See Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).  Additionally, the Eleventh 
Amendment bars a suit for monetary damages against state officials sued in their official 
capacities.  See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990).   
We also agree with the District Court that qualified immunity shields Carroll in his 
individual capacity from monetary damages.  Qualified immunity shields government 
officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  The inquiry, then, includes 
two parts:  (1) whether the plaintiff demonstrated the deprivation of a constitutional right, 
and (2) whether the right was established at the time of the alleged deprivation.  See 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).  Circumstances in a particular case 
determine which part of the test is applied first.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
236-37 (2009).  The District Court held in the alternative that even if the plaintiffs met 
the first prong of the test, the constitutional rights at issue were not clearly established.  
We will follow that approach here. 
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Prior to our ruling in Stevenson, there existed no precedent speaking to the issue 
of housing detainees facing capital sentencing in the SHU.  We noted that a sentenced 
inmate could “conceivably be held in administrative custody merely because his prior 
crimes reasonably foreshadow future misconduct.”  Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70, 71 
(quoting Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)).  We concluded that pretrial 
administrative detention in the SHU required only an “informal nonadversary review” 
that “need not be extensive,” so long as a detainee received an explanation for his transfer 
to the SHU and an opportunity to respond.  Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70, 71.  As noted 
above, plaintiffs received both notice and an opportunity to respond, though not a formal 
hearing.  We agree with the District Court that it was reasonable for Carroll to believe 
that that was all that was required, given Shoats, and considering the finite length of time 
plaintiffs were housed in the SHU and the prison’s security concerns. 
B.  Other Relief 
“The requirement that a case or controversy be actual and ongoing extends 
throughout all stages of federal judicial proceedings, including appellate review.”  
Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted).  
Given that the plaintiffs are no longer pretrial detainees, the District Court properly 
determined that their request for injunctive relief—in the form of a transfer from the 
SHU—was moot.   
Additionally, plaintiffs’ request for the establishment of a system of review for 
transfers of pretrial detainees into the SHU is also moot.  Plaintiffs’ requests do not fall 
into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.  
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Under that doctrine, a court could exercise its jurisdiction and consider the merits of an 
otherwise moot case if “(1) the challenged action is, in its duration, too short to be fully 
litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the 
same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”  Id. at 241.  Even 
assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs’ challenge to their pretrial SHU placement could not 
be fully litigated prior to their sentencing, there is no indication anywhere in the record 
that any of the plaintiffs are currently challenging their sentences, such that they are 
reasonably likely to find themselves again awaiting resentencing. 
IV. 
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
